Sixteen Years Later. Making Sense of Emergence (Again) by Sartenaer, Olivier
Available at:
http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/157147
[Downloaded 2019/04/19 at 07:25:24 ]
"Sixteen Years Later. Making Sense of Emergence (Again)"
Sartenaer, Olivier
Abstract
Sixteen years after Kim's seminal paper offering a welcomed analysis of the
emergence concept, I propose in this paper a needed extension of Kim's work
that does more justice to the actual diversity of emergentism. Rather than
defining emergence as a monolithic third way between reductive physicalism
and substance pluralism, and this through a conjunction of supervenience and
(functional) irreducibility, I develop a comprehensive taxonomy of the possible
varieties of emergence in which each taxon – theoretical, explanatory and
causal emergence – is properly identified and defined. This taxonomy has two
advantages. First, it is unificatory in the sense that the taxa it contains derive from
a common unity principle, which consequently constitutes the very hallmark of
emergentism. Second, it can be shown that the emergence taxa it contains are
able to meet the challenges that are commonly considered as being the hot topics
on the emergentists' agenda, namely the positivity, the cons...
Document type : Article de périodique (Journal article)
Référence bibliographique
Sartenaer, Olivier. Sixteen Years Later. Making Sense of Emergence (Again).  In: Journal for
General Philosophy of Science, Vol. 47, no. 1, p. 79-103 (2016)
DOI : 10.1007/s10838-015-9312-x
	   1	  
Sixteen Years Later 
Making Sense of Emergence (Again) 
 
Olivier Sartenaer1 
 
 
Penultimate draft to appear in the Journal for General Philosophy of Science 
 
 
Abstract 
Sixteen years after Kim's seminal paper offering a welcomed analysis of the emergence 
concept, I propose in this paper a needed extension of Kim's work that does more justice to 
the actual diversity of emergentism. Rather than defining emergence as a monolithic third 
way between reductive physicalism and substance pluralism, and this through a conjunction 
of supervenience and (functional) irreducibility, I develop a comprehensive taxonomy of the 
possible varieties of emergence in which each taxon – theoretical, explanatory and causal 
emergence – is properly identified and defined. This taxonomy has two advantages. First, it is 
unificatory in the sense that the taxa it contains derive from a common unity principle, which 
consequently constitutes the very hallmark of emergentism. Second, it can be shown that the 
emergence taxa it contains are able to meet the challenges that are commonly considered as 
being the hot topics on the emergentists' agenda, namely the positivity, the consistency and 
the triviality/liberality challenges. 
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“[L]ike alcohol, it [the concept of emergence] is a stimulant only in proper 
doses: many who have used it have gotten drunk in the attempt to apply it to 
everything.” (Ablowitz 1939, p. 16) 
 
 
Introduction – The emergence addiction 
 
In his landmark paper “Making Sense of Emergence” published sixteen years ago, Jaegwon 
Kim somewhat half-heartedly acknowledges that emergence – and more generally 
emergentism – has recently made a “strong comeback” that may be rendered explicit by “an 
increasing, and unapologetic, use of expressions like 'emergent property', 'emergent 
phenomenon', and 'emergent law' [...], not only in philosophical writings but in primary 
scientific literature as well” (Kim 1999, p. 4). Such a comeback, which has now classically 
come to be called “the reemergence of emergence”i, seems to largely mirror – as the opening 
passage indicates – a situation of “minor philosophic furor” (Ablowitz 1939, p. 1) that 
occurred in the 1920's in the wake of the advent – and the subsequent premature decline – of 	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the doctrine of emergent evolutionismii. While Ablowitz and Kim's diagnosis of an increasing 
use of emergence rhetoric is perfectly well-founded, it is everything except an undue assertion 
to claim that the enthusiasm for emergence, as well as related holistic ideas, has currently – 
respectively seventy-six and sixteen years later – become still far more acute. Following 
respected scientists who openly claim that “science has now moved from an Age of 
Reductionism to an Age of Emergence” (Laughlin 2005, p. 208) or that we have moved 
“beyond reductionism into a scientific worldview that includes "emergence"“ (Kauffman 
2008, p. 120), it may indeed be fairly argued that emergence is today an integral and 
important part of the contemporary science practiceiii.  
Nevertheless, borrowing from Ablowitz' alcohol analogy presented as an opening 
inscription, it may be said that the still-growing dissemination of emergence in scientific 
discourse today verges on a dangerous addiction. It becomes indeed more and more difficult 
to find a scientific field still free of emergence, and it is almost commonplace for every 
working scientist to claim that the phenomena she is dealing with – from entanglement in 
quantum mechanics to ecosystem dynamics in ecology – constitute the paradigmatic 
instantiations of an emergent behavior.  
As with any kind of addictive substance, such an excessive use of emergence has some 
detrimental effects. To begin with, the very high heterogeneity of the putative 
exemplifications of emergence renders it delicate to identify what would constitute the unity 
of the concept. If there is no common thread that runs through its possible instantiations, 
emergence is nothing but a linguistic tool at the service of a flashy rhetorical exercise. In 
scientific or philosophical debates, then “the only thing participants share is the word 
"emergence"” (Kim 2006, p. 548) or – according to thinkers less charitable to emergentism – 
“the buzzword emergence”(Weinberg 1992, p. 39). Secondly, it is commonplace that the 
broader a concept's extension is, the weaker its instructive value is. If one reasonably wants 
the labeling of a given phenomenon as “emergent” to have some epistemic significance – in 
the sense that learning that a given phenomenon is emergent teaches us something non-trivial 
about this phenomenon –, then one should be careful not to be prone to considering anything 
and everything as paradigmatic exemplifications of emergence. In the limiting case where 
everything emerges – from quantum systems to ecosystems and beyond – emergence becomes 
empty of content and uselessiv. 
Claiming that “too much (frequently thoughtless) emergence is bad for emergence” 
does not mean that there are not very good reasons to invoke the concept or to be an 
emergentist. The emergence addiction certainly finds its impetus in the potential fruitfulness 
of the concept, and it is even plausible that the extent of the addiction is in good proportion 
with the force of the promises that emergence is often supposed to fulfill. Essentially, such 
promises may be gathered into three (non exclusive and non independent) categories. First – 
call this the ontological promise –, emergence would be an efficient tool to conciliate some 
form of scientifically respectable monism with the safeguard of some important bits of reality 
against reduction and elimination. Typically but not exclusively, this first issue is vivid when 
it comes to anything that is related to a so-called “human nature” (e.g. free will). In this 
particular context, emergence would allow to leave untouched the privileged status of 
“specifically human qualities” in spite of their naturalization (see for instance Jennings 1927; 
Sellars 1959; or Sperry 1983). Beside resisting what would be an ontological impoverishment 
of the natural world, emergence is also regularly used to vindicate the autonomy of the special 
sciences against what is commonly seen as a physics enthusiastic imperialism, which has 
historically been conveyed through pejorative catch phrases framed on the model of 
Rutherford's famous claim that “in science, there is only physics; the rest is stamp collecting” 
(quoted in Kim 2010, p. 282; with regard to this epistemic promise, see for instance Bunge 
1982 [for chemistry]; Mayr 2004 [for biology]; and Sawyer 2002 [for psychology]). Thirdly 
	   3	  
and lastly, emergentism is supposed to fulfill an ambitious theoretical promise, namely to 
constitute a solution to numerous old philosophical disputes. For example, in the philosophy 
of chemistry, biology and mind, emergentism has been put forward as a way of dissolving, 
respectively, the mixture-compound debate, the vitalism-materialism knot as well as the 
mind-body problem. Given such high ontological, epistemic and theoretical stakes, it is no 
wonder that so many philosophers and scientists have been – and are still currently – strongly 
attracted by the emergence idea.  
It may actually even be suspected that the balance between the possible fruitfulness 
and the frequent emptiness of the concept of emergence – emptiness of which the emergence 
addiction is a symptom and which may be the consequence of an intrinsic contradiction or a 
trivial characterization (see the “consistency” and the “triviality/liberality challenges” below) 
– is an explanation of the coexistence of two extreme and opposite trends in past and present 
literature on the topic: on one hand, an enthusiastic trend that risks falling into emptiness by 
being blinded by fruitfulness; on the other hand, a suspicious trend that prefers to sacrifice 
fruitfulness to avoid emptinessv. 
In this paper, I will primarily adopt a neutral attitude that is neither enthusiastic about, 
nor suspicious of, emergence and emergentism. Supposing that there may be some good and 
bad things in the notion, I will try to separate the wheat from the chaff in order to render 
emergence as simultaneously instructive and fruitful as it could be. To this purpose, I will 
follow the footsteps of philosophers who – on the model of Kim himself – have actively 
contributed to rendering emergence intelligible or to “making sense of emergence”. In 
particular, such an objective will be achieved through the building of a comprehensive 
taxonomy of the possible varieties of emergence, a taxonomy in which each taxon will be (i) 
constructed and properly identified (sections 1 and 2), (ii) precisely defined on the basis of 
positive criteria that refer to the constitutive and causal dynamics of natural systems and (iii) 
univocally ordered between radical reductionism and outright dualism on the basis of an 
intuitive metric (section 3).  
Even if clarifying emergence by identifying its possible declinations is a conceptual 
task that has already been carried out on different occasionsvi, the analysis I propose in this 
paper offers several non-negligible advantages. First, it consists in a unificatory clarification 
of emergence, i.e. rather than providing a mere list of the varieties of emergence that 
philosophers and scientists have been using in different contexts, it shows how the possible 
forms of the notion derive from a minimal commitment to a common principle of unity, a 
principle which may consequently be legitimately considered as the very hallmark of 
emergence. Secondly, by providing a precise characterization of the varieties of emergence, I 
will show in section 4 how each of them is able to deal with the different following 
challenges, which are commonly considered as being the hot topics on the emergentists' 
agendavii:  
 
• The positivity challenge: Since its very advent in the doctrine of emergent 
evolutionism, emergence lacks a positive – and hence plausibly instructive – 
characterization. For example, stating that emergence is a failure of theoretical 
prediction or simulation, or that it amounts to a conjunction of supervenience and 
irreducibility, does not say so much about what emergence actually isviii. Symptomatic 
of the failure to meet the positivity challenge is the impossibility of knowing precisely 
if emergence is primarily a matter of epistemology or ontology.  
 
• The consistency challenge: As it will become clear in the next section, emergence 
always encounters the risk of being unstable if not self-contradictory. Such a risk 
manifests itself at the epistemic level – where it is indeed prima facie difficult to 
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understand how an emergent phenomenon may be simultaneously determined by, but 
unexplainable on the basis of, its lower-level basis of emergence – as well as at the 
ontological level – where it demands indeed some speculative effort to conceive how 
an emergent entity may be dependent on its basis and yet somehow autonomous from 
itix. Failing to meet the consistency challenge is often a reason why emergence appears 
to be mystical or enigmatic. 
 
• The triviality/liberality challenge: In order to make emergence at least minimally 
instructive, it is necessary to avoid defining the notion in a too liberally way. Two 
typical examples may be mentioned in this respect. First, claiming that “an emergent 
property of a whole is a property that none of the whole's constituents has” is certainly 
true, but also quite trivialx. It indeed merely amounts to a recognition of the fact that 
combinations of properties give rise to different properties, either in the qualitative 
sense (e.g. synthesizing gaseous dihydrogen and dioxygen yields liquid water) or even 
in the quantitative sense (e.g. piling up thousand bricks weighting one kilogram yields 
a one ton wall), a fact that no proponent of reductionism, even the most radical, will 
be prone to deny. Things are similar with respect to accounts according to which an 
emergent phenomenon is not reducible to its underlying parts in isolationxi. It is 
actually a far too strong requirement for reductionism – and consequently a too liberal 
condition for emergence – to merely exclude the possibility of invoking relations 
between the system constituents as well as their relations with the environment. 
Without further qualification, both of these liberal accounts render emergence 
ubiquitous, and hence empty of any significative content. 
 
 
1. The unity of emergentism 
 
As far back as one can trace the history of the doctrine – up to British Emergentism and 
beyondxii – emergentism has always been put forward as a middle course between radical 
monism and dualism (or more generally pluralism). A conciliatory and intermediate view 
between such classical antagonistic stances has indeed been, and is still currently, a repository 
of hopes to fulfill the promises of emergence – a denial of pluralism (or “a little bit of 
monism”) being the ingredient to ensure a minimal compatibility with the scientific image, 
and a denial of monism (or “a little bit of pluralism”) being the ingredient to avoid full-
blooded reductionism. 
 
In this respect, emergentism has always been somehow committed to the following 
theses that together capture the unity of the doctrinexiii:  
 
• The continuity (or homogeneity) thesis: An emergent entity is continuous with its 
emergence basis (or an emergent entity and its emergence basis are homogeneous). 
 
• The discontinuity (or heterogeneity) thesis: An emergent entity is discontinuous with 
its emergence basis (or an emergent entity and its emergence basis are  
heterogeneous). 
 
While the continuity thesis captures a monistic demand, in the sense that it states that 
emergents are not purely disconnected from their basis, the discontinuity thesis constitutes a 
pluralistic commitment, insofar as it specifies that emergents are not merely identical to their 
basis.  
	   5	  
It is noteworthy that there is an implicit reference in these theses to an important 
emergentist tenet, namely the fact that there exists some form of hierarchical order in nature, 
by virtue of which a minimal sense may be given to the idea that emergent entities are 
“higher-level” entities with regard to their “underlying” bases of emergencexiv. It may also be 
noted that the traditional emergentist maxim – “The whole is more than the sum of its parts” – 
constitutes a sufficient criterion for being committed to the continuity and discontinuity 
theses. While acknowledging a part-whole relationship is indeed a minimal recognition of 
continuity in emergence, claiming that an emergent whole “is more than” the mere 
aggregation of its underlying parts also constitutes an acknowledgment of some form of 
discontinuity in emergence. Claiming that “the whole is more than the sum of its parts” is 
nevertheless not a necessary criterion for emergence, for the continuity and discontinuity 
theses allow considering emergence in non-mereological cases – e.g. in cases that involve 
“causal roles” and their “role fillers” that are located at the same compositional level, that is, 
in cases of “flat realization” (Gillett 2003). 
The emergentist unity principle so construed renders explicit the consistency challenge 
I have described above. How is it possible to simultaneously maintain the theses of continuity 
and discontinuity? In other words, how is it possible to deny both monism and pluralism? In 
the particular mereological cases, how is it possible for a whole to be composed of its parts 
and at the same time to be “something more” than its parts? To borrow from Ablowitz's own 
terminology, is this not an “appealing paradox” (Ablowitz 1939, p. 2)? Even if it is true that 
some varieties of emergence may fall short of answering these questions in a satisfactory 
manner, I will show in section 4 how one may secure the consistency of emergence for the 
different kinds of concept that I will identify. At this point, I  can confine myself to giving an 
outline of the (often implicit) emergentist strategy of avoiding outright inconsistency: creating 
a discrepancy between the scopes of continuity and discontinuity, in the sense of considering 
an emergent to be continuous in some R1 respect, and discontinuous in some R2 respect, with 
its emergence basis (with R1≠R2). As a consequence, emergentism of this sort is committed to 
some form F1 of monism and to some other form F2 of pluralism. For example, claiming that 
water liquidity is a property E that emerges from a set of basal properties {Bi} in which figure 
the properties of oxygen and hydrogen, in the sense that (i) E is univocally determined by 
{Bi} and (ii) E cannot be adequately explained on the basis of a full knowledge of {Bi}, is 
arguably a consistent move, insofar as it does not construe continuity and discontinuity in the 
very same respect. Actually, the continuity involved in this illustration is compositional 
continuity whereas the discontinuity involved is explanatory discontinuity. Such an 
emergentist claim may then be considered as a prima facie consistent commitment to some 
form of ontological monism and epistemological pluralism.  
Beside capturing the traditional emergentist maxim, the unity principle identified here 
is faithful to the common uses of emergence, both in past and present emergentisms. As far as 
old-style emergentism – e.g. British emergentism and its foreign declinations – is concerned, 
one may highlight the common commitment to the two theses of continuity and discontinuity 
with the help of the following sample of quotationsxv: 
 
Mind is thus at once new and old. No physiological constellation explains for us why it should 
be mind. But at the same time, being thus new, mind is through its physiological character 
continuous with the neural processes which are not mental. It is not something distinct and 
broken off from them, but it has its roots or foundations in all the rest of the nervous system. It 
is in this sense that mind and mental process are vital but not merely vital (Alexander 1920, p. 
8. Emphasis mine).  
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We shall argue that there are levels of causality in nature and that new properties and 
capacities arise with novel integrations. We shall aim to show that genetic continuity does not 
conflict with logical discontinuity (Sellars 1922, p. 322. Emphasis mine).  
 
The theory that organic responses have mental quality in the degree to which they deal with 
the uncertain recognizes both continuity and difference […]. There is neither a sudden jump 
from the merely organic to the intellectual, nor is there complete assimilation of the latter to 
primitive modes of the former (Dewey 1929, p. 220. Emphasis mine). 
 
While being often quite different from classical emergentism, today's forms of emergentism 
may also be viewed as particular ways of construing the continuity and discontinuity theses, 
with an emergent entity being “dependent” on, but “distinct” from its underlying parts (Crane 
2001), “constituted” by its parts, but “autonomous” from them (Bedau,1997), or finally 
“supervenient” on, but “irreducible” to them (Kim 1999; and Kim 2006). 
Before turning to the next section, it is worth drawing attention to the fact that, while 
being extremely general and therefore liberal, the unity principle proposed here for emergence 
has a normative connotation, by virtue of which some particular conceptualizations of 
emergence existing in literature  are ipso facto ruled out as “genuine” forms of emergencexvi. 
Such a restriction should nevertheless not be taken too seriously, in the sense that ruled out 
concepts, i.e. concepts that fail to meet the continuity and discontinuity theses, may be 
consistent, useful or fruitful. There are just good reasons to consider that they differ too 
drastically from usual emergence to be qualified as forms of emergence without further 
confusing the debates. 
 
 
2. The plural unity of emergentism – Building a taxonomy of emergence 
 
While the aforementioned continuity and discontinuity theses capture the prime unity of 
emergentism, their very equivocality also makes this unity plural. There exist indeed 
numerous different ways of construing and conciliating both theses, and each of these ways 
may be associated with a particular form of emergence. With this idea in mind, it is possible 
to develop a twofold analysis at the term of which different taxa of emergence may be 
identified. Since the successive steps of such an analysis have already been extensively 
described elsewhere (see Sartenaer, 2011; and Sartenaer, 2013), I provide only a summary of 
it in this section. Section 3 will then be devoted to providing precise definitions of the 
emergence taxa and to showing how these taxa deal with the challenges described in the 
introduction. 
 
 2.1. Representational and causal emergence 
 
Presuming it is necessary to conciliate a certain form F1 of monism with another form F2 of 
pluralism in order to consistently meet the emergentist unity principle – and hence to be an 
emergentist –, identifying the available emergentist strategies requires one to distinguish 
between different kinds of monism and pluralism and to assess their mutual compatibility. 
The following three kinds of monism will be discussed here – the corresponding kinds of 
pluralism being merely their negationxvii:  
 
• Substance monism: All natural entities are ultimately and exclusively composed of 
physical elementary particles. 
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• Property monism: All properties are ultimately and exclusively realized by 
(combinations of) physical elementary properties. 
 
• Predicate (and proposition) monism: All scientific predicates are ultimately and 
exclusively definable as (combinations of) physical elementary predicates (and 
consequently all scientific propositions are deducible from physical elementary 
propositions). 
 
Taking for granted some relations of entailment between these varieties of monism, 
namely that predicate monism entails property monism which entails substance monism, it is 
only possible to identify the following four non-contradictory viewsxviii:  
 
• Reductive physicalism as being predicate monism (and hence property and substance 
monism). 
 
• Non-reductiveR physicalism as being the conjunction of property monism (and hence 
substance monism) with predicate pluralism. 
 
• Non-reductiveC materialism as being the conjunction of substance monism with 
property pluralism (and hence predicate pluralism). 
 
• Substance pluralism (and hence property and predicate pluralism).  
 
As far as they respectively consist of radical monism and pluralism, reductive physicalism 
and substance pluralism do not meet the emergentist unity principle. Both views fail to meet 
either the discontinuity or the continuity thesis. In this respect, they are not proper stances for 
conceptualizing emergence; rather, they are the extreme positions between which various 
forms of emergentism may be developed as middle courses.  
The first step of this analysis already reveals that, between radical reductionism and 
outright pluralism, there exist two distinct (families of) such middle courses, viz. non-
reductiveR physicalism and non-reductiveC materialism. Being a conjunction of property 
monism (and hence substance monism) with predicate pluralism, the former meets the 
emergentist unity principle insofar as it is committed to a form of causal (and hence 
substantial) continuity and a form of representational discontinuity. I call this view 
“representational emergentism”, capturing the idea of the representational irreducibility – 
therefore the “R” written as a superscript – of emergents in a physicalistic ontology. Being a 
conjunction of substance monism with property pluralism (and hence predicate pluralism), 
non-reductiveC materialism meets the emergentist unity principle in a different way, namely 
by construing continuity as substantial continuity and discontinuity as causal (and hence 
representational) discontinuity. This view may then be called “causal emergentism” in the 
sense that it captures the causal irreducibility – therefore the “C” written as a superscript – of 
emergents in a materialistic ontology.  
At this point, two terminological clarifications should be brought to light. First, 
although materialism and physicalism are usually taken to be synonymous or, more precisely, 
the latter is conceived as an historical extension of the former (see for instance Loewer 2001), 
it is clear that I construe these notions differently here. Whereas materialism is defined as a 
particular declination of substance monism, physicalism is identified with property monism 
(and hence substance monism)xix. As a consequence, it is possible in this context to argue for 
a non-physicalist version of materialism – the converse being nevertheless forbidden –, i.e. a 
view according to which every natural entity is ultimately made of elementary physical 
	   8	  
particles but may exhibit non-physically realized properties. Secondly, the reader may be 
surprised to read about representational and causal emergence in place of the more usual 
couples of notions that are “epistemological/ontological” or “weak/strong” emergences (see 
for instance, respectively, Silberstein and McGeever 1999; and Chalmers 2006). As far as the 
second distinction is concerned, here I am simply following the footsteps of philosophers who 
prefer to use adjectives like “weak”, “strong”, “modest”, “robust”, etc., to qualify the strength 
of the emergence involved, for instance be it absolute or relative to scientific theories at a 
certain time, its type being stipulated by expressions like “representational” or “causal” that 
indicate the nature of the emergence relata (respectively our representations of the world and 
causal properties; see Van Gulick 2001). As far as the first distinction is concerned, the reader 
may use as he pleases the couple “representational/causal” and “epistemological/ontological” 
interchangeably. I nevertheless try to avoid the latter terminology as it may be somewhat 
confusing. Whereas the terminology I prefer explicitly indicates the type of emergence 
involved, the alternative is highly dependent on the way one conceives the complex 
relationship between ontology and epistemology.  
 
 2.2. Theoretical and explanatory emergence 
 
It is now possible to expand this first taxonomy by distinguishing – within the scope of non-
reductiveR physicalism – between sub-types of representational emergence. The further 
distinction I propose to draw is based on the difference between derivational and functional 
models of representational reduction. Whereas the first model can be traced back to Ernst 
Nagel's inter-theoretic reduction and is primarily a matter of connecting concepts and 
deducing laws between scientific theories (Nagel 1949), the second has been mainly put 
forward by Kim as way of causally or mechanistically explaining higher-level property 
instances (Kim 1998, chapter 4). What interests me here is that the derivational model of 
representational reduction is more restrictive than the functional one, in the sense that a 
derivable property – or, more rigorously, a property where the propositions in which it figures 
are derivable from propositions in which figure only lower-level properties – is necessarily a 
functionally reducible property, the converse being not truexx. As a consequence, non-
reductiveR physicalism may be divided into the following viewsxxi: 
 
• Non-deductive physicalism as being the conjunction of property monism with 
predicate pluralism built on a failure of derivational reduction. 
 
• Non-reductiveR* physicalism as being the conjunction of property monism with 
predicate pluralism built on a failure of (both derivational and) functional reduction. 
 
Insofar as it meets the emergentist unity principle by construing continuity as causal 
continuity and discontinuity as theoretical discontinuity, non-deductive physicalism may be 
associated with a variety of representational emergence called “theoretical emergence”. In a 
similar fashion, for it is committed to a form of explanatory discontinuity, non-reductiveR* 
physicalism constitutes a proper place to conceptualize another variant of representational 
emergence, namely “explanatory emergence” (for further details on this distinction, see 
Sartenaer, 2013).  
 
 2.3. Summary – A taxonomy of emergence 
 
At this point, before turning to the next section, which is more directly dedicated to the prime 
objective of this paper, it may be helpful to summarize what has been said so far. From what 
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has been considered to be the unity of emergentism – namely constituting a middle course 
between radical monism and pluralism through the conciliation of the continuity and 
discontinuity theses –, it has been possible to identify three different emergentist frameworks, 
viz. non-deductive physicalism, non-reductiveR* physicalism and non-reductiveC materialism. 
These stances have then been successively associated with the following conceptualizations 
of emergence:  
 
• Theoretical emergence – causal continuity and theoretical discontinuity 
“Theories about the whole cannot be logically derived from theories about the parts”. 
 
• Explanatory emergence – causal continuity and explanatory discontinuity 
“The behaviour of the whole cannot be adequately explained on the sole basis of a full  
knowledge of the behaviour of the parts”. 
 
• Causal emergence – substantial continuity and causal discontinuity 
“The whole exhibits genuinely new causal powers that are not identical to any  
combination of the powers of the parts”. 
 
In 1999, Kim made a major contribution to making sense of emergence by resorbing 
the whole cluster of vague and somewhat ill-defined emergentist ideas into a unique but more 
or less unsatisfactory – by his own admission – characterization, namely that emergent 
properties are supervenient and irreducible (in the functional sense). In the present section I 
have pushed this result a little bit further by showing that, theoretical emergence apart, there 
exists more than one way to meet the supervenience and irreducibility criteria, viz. through 
explanatory and causal emergencexxii. In the next section, I will continue to push forward in 
this way by providing positive, consistent and non-trivial characterizations of the emergence 
taxa.  
 
 
3. Making sense of emergence (again) 
 
So far, I have just provided general benchmarks that allow us to coarsely delineate different 
views that have in common the rejection of radical monism and pluralism, and which 
consequently constitute proper frameworks for the conceptualization of emergence. While a 
first intuitive characterization of the emergence taxa has already been proposed above on this 
basis, the boundaries between them are still unclear, insofar as these characterizations are 
couched in negative terms – respectively as a failure of Nagelian reduction, a failure of 
functional (or more generally explanatory) reduction and a lack of a physical realization basis. 
One may then raise the question: what makes a given phenomenon, say, explanatorily 
emergent? Put differently, what makes a phenomenon causally continuous but explanatorily 
discontinuous with its underlying basis – a result of which being that the phenomenon cannot 
be functionally reduced?  
Answering such questions – and hence providing definitional criteria for the 
emergence taxa – primarily requires us to rephrase the emergentist unity principle in the 
following operational wayxxiii: 
 
• The continuity thesis = the micro-determination thesis:  
There is a determination relationship Dup going from the emergence basis to the 
higher-level putative emergent. 
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• The discontinuity thesis = the macro-determination thesis: 
There is a determination relationship Ddown going from the higher-level putative 
emergent to the emergence basis. 
 
Insofar as the existence of an upward determinative relation is a minimal monistic 
requirement, the very existence of something like Dup is what secures continuity in 
emergence. It precludes emergents from being merely broken off from their basis. 
Symmetrically, the determinative potency that a relation like Ddown confers to putative 
emergents constitutes the minimal pluralistic commitment ensuring discontinuity in 
emergencexxiv. The very existence of Ddown precludes emergents from being identical to their 
basis, or mere “danglers” living in its shadow. 
Positively defining the emergence taxa identified in section 2 then requires the 
identification of “deep and instructive” metaphysical relations that adequately capture Dup and 
Ddown. To this purpose, contemporary metaphysics constitute a perfect toolbox in which one 
may pick up different determination relations and assess to what extent they are tailored for 
the job. 
With this idea in mind, I propose the following strategy. In section 3.1, I identify the 
relations Dup and Ddown that allow for the definition of the “emergentist Grail”, i.e. the version 
of emergence that would do justice to the emergentist promises by constituting the most 
balanced conciliation of monism and pluralism. In section 3.2, I show that such a concept falls 
short of meeting the consistency challenge, and consequently needs to be amended. Two 
options will successively be investigated to avoid such inconsistency: (i) keeping Dup 
untouched while weakening Ddown and (ii) weakening Dup while keeping Ddown untouched. 
These options will respectively transform the initially inconsistent emergentist Grail into the 
consistent emergence taxa that are representational and causal emergence. In the meantime, 
these taxa will have gained a proper and positive definition. In a final section (section 4), I 
will show how the properly defined taxa are able to meet the challenges figuring on the 
emergentists' agenda. 
 
 3.1. The emergentist Grail 
 
Let us then begin by establishing what would be the “best way” to construe the determinative 
relations Dup and Ddown – the merit of such a way being evaluated by the extent to which it 
allows emergence to fulfill its promises. Without presuming that the resulting concept will be 
consistent, it will in any case constitute a useful benchmark, or a reference concept, against 
which the emergence taxa identified above will be measured. 
In order to fulfill its ontological, epistemic and theoretical promises, the concept I am 
trying to frame, which I will from now on refer to as “emergence*”, must be the proper 
ground on which the most balanced conciliation between monism and pluralism can be built. 
Emergence* must at the same time be monistic enough to fit smoothly into the scientific 
image, and pluralistic enough to secure (at least) an ontological respectability for higher-level 
entities. One may reasonably suppose that the former demand will be met through 
physicalism, whereas the latter should be through causal non-reductivism. Should it be a 
consistent view, non-reductiveC physicalism would indeed certainly constitute a good 
compromise between radical reductionism and substance pluralism, for it would allow to 
vindicate the ontological genuineness of emergents without invoking any non-physical 
mystical entities or powers. In the words of Carl Gillett, “such a property [emergence*, a 
concept called “strong emergence” by Gillett] constitutes a metaphysical "grail", for if it can 
be shown to exist, then it would be established that we can hold both PHY [physicalism] and 
HCE [higher causal efficacy] to be true and the reductionist’s challenge would have been 
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answered” (Gillett 2002, p. 102). Such an emergentist “Grail” is to be located between 
explanatory and causal emergence in the taxonomy built in section 2, for emergentism* 
construes continuity (or Dup) in a stronger sense than causal emergence does – physicalism 
entailing materialism, but not the other way aroundxxv –, and discontinuity (or Ddown) in a 
stronger sense than explanatory emergence does – causal irreducibility entailing explanatory 
irreducibility, but not the other way around (see figure 1).  
 
 
 
Fig. 1 – Emergence* within the emergence taxonomy built in section 2. The concept lies between explanatory 
and causal emergence, insofar as it construes emergence through the conciliation of Ddown and Dup , which are 
respectively “stronger” determinative relations than Dwdown and Dwup – the “w” superscript standing for 
“weakening”. Are not represented here non-deductive physicalism and reductiveR* physicalism (on the left side 
of the figure) and substance pluralism (on the right side of the figure). These will be incorporated in due time. 
 
 
 This being said, let us now try to identify which determinative relations Dup and Ddown 
would do the job – i.e. allowing us to define emergence* in the way described above. As far 
as the monistic or continuity relation Dup is concerned, two options may successively be 
considered. To begin with, one may conceive of Dup as being supervenience, therefore 
considering that emergents* are micro-determined by their bases in the sense that, when one 
fixes the basis, one fixes the emergent* – and not the other way around. While many thinkers 
have been attracted – from the 1970's onwards – by such an option (see for instance 
McLaughlin 1997; and Kim 1999), one may be reluctant to invoke it when framing 
emergence*. A first reason for this lies in the fact that supervenience does not entail the fairly 
monistic stance we want for emergence*, namely physicalism. Supervenience actually turns 
out to be compatible with every view described in section 2, with the notable exception of 
(radical) substance pluralism – supervenience therefore only securing materialism in the sense 
understood herexxvi. Another (but not independent) reason is that supervenience in itself is not 
a genuine and explanatory metaphysical relation; rather, it merely expresses a covariation 
scheme between sets of entities (Kim 1993, chapter 9; Kim 1998, chapter 1; Kim 2006; Van 
Gulick 1992, Van Gulick 2001; Stephan 1999a). Trying to explicate emergence* – or, more 
precisely, the continuity or micro-determination clause of emergence* – through 
supervenience then merely consists in an obscurum per obscurius explication, i.e. trying to 
solve a mystery (emergence*) on the basis of another (supervenience). What we actually need 
in place of mere supervenience is a deep metaphysical relation that grounds supervenience, in 
the sense that it explains why when we fix a set of basal properties, we fix the properties that 
putatively emerge* from it. This leads us to the second possible option for construing Dup, 
namely (physical) realization. Such a relation is suitable for the job, insofar as (i) it is a deep 
metaphysical relation (viz. constitution) that explains supervenience (Kim 1998, chapter 1)xxvii 
and (ii) it allows us to define the fairly monistic view, namely (realization) physicalism (see 
for instance Melnyk 2003), that emergentism* requires.  
	   12	  
Let us now turn to Ddown. Since higher-level determinative potency of putative 
emergents is a notion that has already drawn considerable attention (beginning notably with 
Kim 1999; see also Emmeche et al. 2000; or Hulswit 2005), it will not be necessary to discuss 
this notion at length here. Suffice it to say that Sperry-style downward causation – a 
downwardly causal relation that is efficient, reflexive and diachronic – will do the job, insofar 
as (i) it is a deep metaphysical relation (viz. causation) that incidentally explains why 
emergents are ontologically new entities in the worldxxviii and (ii) it allows us to define the 
fairly pluralistic view, namely causal non-reductivism, that emergentism* requires.  
Summing up, emergence* can be properly defined as follows, here taking properties as 
the emergence units:  
 
A property E emerges* from an underlying physical basis {Bi} iff (1) E is realized in 
{Bi} [continuity or micro-determination clause] and (2) E downwardly acts – in 
Sperry's sense – on {Bi} [discontinuity or macro-determination clause]xxix. 
 
So far, so good. At this point, we've come up with a positive and non-trivial definition 
of a reference concept of emergence. Emergence* occurs when a high-level phenomenon is at 
the same time constituted by, or realized in, its underlying physical basis – hence it is 
supervenient on its basis –, and it has the ability to causally interact, in a downwardly fashion, 
on its basis – hence it is causally, and consequently also representationally, irreducible to it. 
Without presuming for the moment that such a concept is consistent or that its definitional 
clauses refer to anything in our world (for that matter, it is not implausible that no property is 
actually physically realized or that Sperry-style downward causation is nomologically 
impossible), emergence* so defined constitutes a first qualification of Kim's 1999 emergence, 
conceived as the conjunction of supervenience and (functional) irreducibility. On the basis of 
this intermediate result, we can now return to the emergence taxa identified in section 2. 
 
 3.2. The emergentist dilemma 
 
It may be argued in different ways that emergence* falls short of meeting the consistency 
challenge. First, in a very intuitive and “visual” way, it may be noted that emergence* does 
not fit properly into the emergence taxonomy. While representational and causal emergences 
have been respectively built on the consistent conjunctions of property monism with predicate 
pluralism and substance monism with property pluralism – hence construing in both cases 
continuity and discontinuity in different respects –, emergence* may only be considered as an 
inconsistent conciliation of property monism and property pluralism, construing both 
continuity and discontinuity in the very same causal respect. Another, equivalent way of 
emphasizing this is to show that physical realizationism – and hence physicalism – is 
incompatible with Sperry-style downward causation – and hence causal non-reductivism. This 
can be vindicated by mentioning the fact that realization entails causal inheritance between a 
realized property and its realizers, therefore implying causal reductivism that cannot 
reasonably be conciliated with causal non-reductivismxxx. More generally, the incompatibility 
between realization and Sperry-style downward causation can be highlighted through so-
called “arguments from realization” (Gillett 2002), a particular case of which is Kim's famous 
and highly debated “causal exclusion argument” (see for instance Kim 1998, chapter 2). In a 
nutshell, these arguments tend to demonstrate that realization and Sperry-style downward 
causation are respectively too strong continuistic and discontinuistic requirements to be held 
together. 
Taking for granted that such arguments are sound, amending emergence* in order for 
it to properly deal with the consistency challenge requires the weakening of at least one of its 
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definitional clauses – realization or downward causation – and hence the abandonment of 
either physicalism or causal non-reductivism. In what follows, I successively focus on the two 
horns of what clearly appears to be a serious dilemma for emergentism. 
To begin with, a first avoidance maneuver consists in dropping emergence*'s Dup – 
realization – in favor of a weaker dependance relation Dwup that would tolerate a conjunction 
consistent with Sperry-style downward causation. What kind of micro-determination relation 
would do the job here? Arguably, supervenience without realization would, for (i) it is a 
weaker dependance relation than realization insofar as, as I mentioned earlier, realization 
entails supervenience, but not vice versa, (ii) it can then be consistently held together with 
downward causation, as the lack of realization, or of any other constitution relation, precludes 
causal inheritance – and hence causal reduction –, and (iii) it is a minimal determination 
relationship that excludes (radical) substance pluralism. Such a strategy seems however to 
bring back into the picture a possible problem that I've tried to avoid earlier while I was 
seeking a positive definition of emergence*, namely that supervenience without realization is 
not a genuine and explanatory relation, or that it is in itself as mysterious as the concept it is 
meant to (partly) explicate (emergence). But what has been a possible source of trouble for 
defining a reference concept of emergence is not necessarily one when it comes to identifying 
a viable middle path between inconsistent non-reductiveC physicalism and outright pluralism. 
There is precisely a way in this context to avoid an intrinsically negative construal of 
supervenience, viz. postulating its radical bruteness. Arguing that supervenience is an ultimate 
or brute empirical fact is indeed not necessarily a recognition that we are ignorant of what can 
ground or explain supervenience, but rather that, as a matter of fact, nothing grounds or 
explains supervenience. In this context, borrowing from Lycan's terminology, a non-
physically realized but supervenient property P is a supervenient but non-”superdupervenient” 
property, i.e. there is no (naturalism-friendly) way of explaining why P supervenes – or as 
Horgan puts it: “[C]ertain non-physical properties could be supervenient on physical 
properties and yet causally basic (in the sense that they generate fundamental causal forces 
over and above physical forces) [...]. All properties and facts could be supervenient on 
physical properties and facts even if certain supervenience facts are metaphysically sui 
generis [...]” (Horgan 1993, p. 560). 
Of course, dropping realization (Dup) for supervenience without realization (Dwup) 
leads to an abandonment of physicalism in favor of materialism, while keeping Sperry-style 
downward causation (Ddown) untouched maintains causal non-reductivism. As a consequence, 
the consistent conjunction of Dwup and Ddown is definitional of non-reductiveC materialism, 
then conceived as a doctrine stating that there exist brute supervenient and causally 
irreducible properties exhibited by purely material systems. Insofar as it implies a conciliation 
of property pluralism with substance monism, the very existence of heterogeneous causal 
orders in a thoroughly materialistic context is the hallmark of what I earlier called causal 
emergence. Accordingly:  
 
A property E causally emerges from an underlying physical basis {Bi} iff (1) E 
supervenes on – but is not realized in – {Bi} [substantial continuity] and (2) E 
downwardly acts – in Sperry's sense – on {Bi} [causal discontinuity]. 
 
As a historical illustration, it may be argued that early British emergentists like 
Samuel Alexander, Lloyd Morgan or Charlie Dunbar Broad had in mind something very 
similar to causal emergence, insofar as they were clearly committed to brute supervenience 
and downward causationxxxi.  The “bruteness” of the (implicit version of) supervenience they 
invoked was actually the very core of their doctrine – as well as, incidentally, one of the 
possible reasons of the movement's premature decline at the end of the 1920'sxxxii. The 
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supervenience of emergent entities was indeed something to be noted with a “loyal attitude” 
(Morgan 1923, p. 4) or a “natural piety” (Alexander 1920, p. 46), or was the expression of an 
“unique and ultimate [trans-ordinal] law” (Broad 1925, p. 65). It was even suggested that the 
bruteness of supervenience was the expression of an (immanent) divine activity (Morgan, 
1923 p. 13), an idea that may lead us to conceive of non-reductiveC materialism as a 
reappraisal of Malebranche's occasionalism or Leibniz' pre-established harmony, but in a 
version that is relative to heterogeneous orders of properties instead of a diversity of 
substancesxxxiii. 
So much for the first horn of the emergentists' dilemma. Avoiding emergence*’s 
inconsistency may also be achieved through a second maneuver, namely dropping Ddown – 
Sperry-style downward causation – in favor of a weaker macro-determination relation Dwdown 
that would tolerate physicalism.   
Conveniently enough, there already exist hints as to which macro-determination 
relation Dwdown would do the job in classical emergentism (and actually even further back all 
the way to Aristotle). As early as 1909, Sellars already urged for the enlargement of the 
category of causation (Sellars 1909) in order for it to encompass the irreducibly effective and 
determinative action that modes of organization – or Morgan's relatedness – can exert on 
emergence bases (Sellars 1922). Sellars' campaign for enlarging the scope of causation – a 
campaign that he actively pursued throughout his career (see for instance Sellars 1959) – 
pointed towards a steady goal, namely that of considering emergent potency, contra Sperry, 
as different in kind from “usual” intra-level determination (viz. efficient causation, however 
one construes it precisely). According to what can be from now on referred to as “Sellars' 
view”, there would then exist (at least) two distinct and irreducible modes of causal 
determination in nature, namely (i) intra-level efficient causation that governs the succession 
of physical events through time, and (ii) inter-level emergent causation – other than efficient – 
that regulates (or harnesses, restraints, constrains, orientates, etc.) the way in which 
underlying intra-level causal relations unfold. 
The general idea according to which there is maybe more than one form of 
determination that we refer to while using the single word “causation” has some proponents in 
contemporary metaphysics (see for instance Cartwright 2004; or Hall 2004). However, the 
return to an Aristotle-style causal eclecticism particularly attracts today philosophers in an 
attempt to reframe downward causation to render it physicalism-friendly and immune to 
realization arguments. In such a context, Sperry-style efficient downward causation, working 
in the same way as intra-level “usual” causation (e.g. by involving energy transfer), has been 
regularly replaced by alternative macro-determination relations like – to name here but a few 
examples – “medium downward causation” (in contrast with the strong version of the 
concept; see Emmeche et al. 2000), “formal causation” (Scott 2007), top-down “constraint” 
(Kistler 2009), the “machretic determination” (which is actually considered as non-causal by 
Gillett, but this seems essentially to be terminological; Gillett 2010), or “reflexive downward 
regulation” (Walsh 2012).   
But how can we characterize such a Sellars-style downward causation? Since doing 
otherwise would lead us too far away from my initial objective, and since there clearly lacks 
to this day an extensive philosophical analysis of the possible non-efficient forms of 
causation, I shall content myself here with providing a concise sketch of what appears to be a 
very promising path towards the elaboration of a non-trivial and physicalism-friendly version 
of emergentism. In a nutshell, while one may consider intra-level efficient causation as the 
effective manifestation of property dispositions, emergent inter-level determination may be 
associated with the specific conditions that trigger the manifestation of these dispositions. The 
emergent triggering conditions are specific here in the following sense: it is by virtue of being 
part of a certain whole – so it is by virtue of being part of the basis of a given emergent E –
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that basal dispositions are triggered in a certain way. In this context, emergent determination 
can be said to be causal, but not in the “usual” intra-level sense (e.g. it does not involve 
energy transfer; it is not “productive”), so it does not entail overdetermination troubles or 
causal inheritance while being conciliated with realization. At the same time, emergent 
determination makes a genuine difference in the course of events that renders it explanatorily 
indispensable (it actually supports counterfactuals of the form: if E had not emerged, basal 
events {Bi} would have run their course differently)xxxiv. 
Construed in this way, Sellars-style downward causation is a good candidate for 
Dwdown, for it does not conflict with realization (Dup) and hence physicalism and causal 
reduction, and it nonetheless secures a non-trivial form of irreducibility, viz. representational 
irreducibility. Put differently, the consistent conjunction of Sellars-style downward causation 
(Dwdown) and realization (Dup) allows for avoiding causal exclusion while opposing 
explanatory exclusion, insofar as it grants causal relevance to non-efficiently-causal emergent 
properties. Such a conjunction is thus definitional of non-reductiveR physicalism, then 
conceived as a doctrine that states that there exist physically realized properties that may non-
efficiently constrain their own basal conditions, rendering these realized properties 
representationally irreducible. For it implies a conciliation of property monism and predicate 
pluralism, this view is committed to representational emergentism. Accordingly:  
 
A property E representationally emerges from an underlying physical basis {Bi} iff (1) 
E is realized in {Bi} [causal continuity] and (2) E downwardly acts – in Sellars' sense 
– on {Bi} [representational discontinuity]xxxv. 
 
It should be noted that adopting a realistic attitude towards representational emergents 
demands the enlargement of the scope of classical causal realism built on the basis of what 
Kim once called “Alexander's dictum”, stating that “to be real is [...] to possess causal 
powers” (Kim 1992, p. 134). In order to encompass emergent causation, one should rather 
assert that “to be real is to have a determinative influence – and consequently to play 
irreducible roles in adequate explanations of the world” (inspired from Peacocke 2007, p. 
272). 
Before synthesizing the results of the analysis pursued so far, a qualification should be 
brought to light. One may indeed wonder if it is possible to identify a distinction criterion 
associated with Sellars-style downward causation that would allow to distinguish between 
both sub-types of representational emergence described in section 2, viz. theoretical and 
explanatory emergence. Because addressing this issue properly would certainly require a 
detailed analysis that I leave for the moment to another paper, I simply point here to a 
possible way of achieving this goal. In a nutshell, one could think of making a distinction 
between the two following varieties of emergent causation: (i) reflexive emergent causation 
whose relata are (instances of) emergent properties and their own emergence bases, and (ii) 
non-reflexive and selective emergent causation that consists in the action exerted on emergent 
bases by (instances of) properties that pertain to a selective environment. The notion of 
“selection” is understood here in a very broad sense, namely as any kind of environmental 
process that gives rise to – or that merely reinforces – some higher-level (functional) 
properties independently of their lower-level (structural) propertiesxxxvi, therefore producing 
genuine cases of multiple realization (Papineau 2010). While the first variety of Sellars-style 
downward causation, reflexive emergent causation, is a sufficient condition to secure 
functional or explanatory irreducibility – and hence to define, together with realization, 
explanatory emergence –, non-reflexive and selective emergent causation is sufficient to lead 
to a failure of Nagelian inter-theoretical reduction – and hence to define, together with 
realization, theoretical emergence –, insofar as the multiple realizability it gives rise to 
	   16	  
precludes the establishment of type-identities between higher-level properties and their bases 
(see for instance Fodor 1974). Accordingly:  
 
A property E explanatorily emerges from an underlying physical basis {Bi} iff (1) E is 
realized in {Bi} [causal continuity] and (2) E downwardly acts – in Sellars' reflexive 
sense – on {Bi} [explanatory discontinuity]; 
 
A property E theoretically emerges from an underlying physical basis {Bi} iff (1) E is 
realized in {Bi} [causal continuity] and (2) environmental properties tend to select E 
through downwardly acting – in Sellars' non-reflexive and selective sense – on {Bi}  
[theoretical discontinuity] 
 
It is now time to summarize what has been said so far. In figure 2 are presented and 
ordered the emergence taxa identified in section 2. Each of them is properly defined through 
the conciliation of a micro-determination relation Dup that grounds emergents in their lower-
level bases, and a macro-determination relation Ddown  that secures some autonomy for 
emergents from their bases. The table goes from radical monism  (on the left), where Ddown  is 
inexistent and Dup “maximal”, to radical pluralism (on the right), where Ddown  is “maximal” 
and Dup inexistent. The emergentist options in between are distinguishable from each other 
based on the strength they respectively confer to Ddown and Dup, the ratio of Ddown's 
strength/Dup's strength (or Dup's strength/Ddown's strength) being the mark of the type of 
emergence (or reduction) involved. In the middle of the table, emergence* crystallizes the 
inconsistent attempt to conciliate the too strong versions of Ddown and Dup, namely realization 
and Sperry-style downward causation.  
 
 
4. Emergence to the test 
 
Now that the emergence taxa identified in section 2 have been properly defined and ordered, 
let us close this paper by examining the way in which they deal with the emergentists' 
challenges described in the introduction. To begin with, each taxon properly meets the 
positivity challenge, for they are defined on the basis of determinative relations – constitutive 
(Dup) or causal (Ddown) – and not through, say, some failure of reducibility. A qualification is 
necessary, though: causal emergence appeals to brute supervenience, which is arguably not a 
deep, instructive and positive relation. However, this is not as negative a characterization as it 
may prima facie appear, insofar as, as we saw in section 3.2, there is, so to speak, no 
positivity to be found in such a context, causal emergentism being precisely construed as the 
recognition of inscrutable (causal) gaps in nature that we have to accept devotedly. 
Theoretical, explanatory and causal emergences also meet the novelty challenge (see footnote 
8), for their newness is always grounded in an empirical process, and this process precisely 
explains why they are associated with, respectively, new predicates (because multiply realized 
properties cannot be type-identified with their realizer's properties), new constraining 
individuals (because emergent constraining powers cannot be exerted by emergent bases), and 
new causal powers (because emergent causal powers cannot be possessed by emergent bases).   
Second, the way in which I have built the emergence taxa – namely through the 
conjunction of different forms of monism and pluralism – makes these taxa consistent, 
therefore meeting the emergentists' second challenge. In particular, representational and 
causal versions of emergence have been purposively framed so that they also meet Kim's 
causal challenge (see footnote 9) by dissolving from the outset the overdetermination 
problem, by dropping, respectively, efficient downward causation and realization. 
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Fig. 2 – A comprehensive taxonomy of emergence, where each taxon has been properly defined on the basis of a 
continuistic (or monistic) and discontinuistic (or pluralistic) clause. To avoid ambiguities, I refer to Sperry-style 
and Sellars-style downward causation as “downward causation” and “downward constraint”, respectively.  
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Turning now to the triviality/liberality challenge, it is clear that the way in which the 
emergence taxa have been defined offers non-trivial demarcation criteria to distinguish 
between emergent and non-emergent phenomena. This proceeds from the fact that it is prima 
facie plausible that, for example, some limited class of phenomena exhibits Sellars-style 
reflexive downward causation, rendering explanatory emergence neither ubiquitous nor 
merely inexistent. 
Consequently, theoretical, explanatory and causal emergences are consistent, non-
trivial and positively defined concepts that are, each in their own way, faithful to the 
emergentist unity principle, making them proper and genuine varieties of emergence.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Sixteen years after Kim's seminal paper offering a welcome analysis of the concept of 
emergence, I have proposed in this paper a needed extension of Kim's work that does greater 
justice to the actual diversity of emergentism. Rather than defining emergence as a monolithic 
middle path between reductive physicalism and substance pluralism through a conjunction of 
supervenience and (functional) irreducibility, I have developed a comprehensive taxonomy of 
the possible varieties of emergence in which each taxon – theoretical, explanatory and causal 
emergence – has been properly identified and defined. This taxonomy has the advantage of 
being unificatory, in the sense that the taxa it contains derive from a common unity principle, 
which consequently constitutes the very hallmark of emergentism. Furthermore, the 
emergence taxa properly deal with the challenges that figure on the emergentists' agenda, 
namely the positivity, the consistency and the triviality/liberality challenges. The overall 
picture of this analysis synthesized in figure 2 constitutes the desired contribution in making 
sense of emergence (again). 
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  i	  Initially owing to Bryon Cunningham's eponymous paper (Cunningham, 2001).	  ii	  One can find early traces of this doctrine in Lloyd Morgan's Spencer's Philosophy of Science 
(1913), in which the author introduced the concept of emergence in literature since it had been 
originally and somewhat anecdotally coined by George Henry Lewes in 1875. Emergent 
evolutionism has subsequently been mainly championed through Morgan's Emergent 
Evolution (1923) and, in a closely related way, Roy Wood Sellars' Evolutionary Naturalism 
(1922). 	  iii	  Beside the evocative fact that entire journals and popular works are now dedicated to 
emergence, evidence of this may be found in the fact that emergence has now been introduced 
into textbooks for students. For example, in a popular biology textbook, emergence is 
presented as one of the big “themes in the study of life”, even before the key notions of cell, 
heredity and evolution (see Reece, 2010, introduction).	  iv	  Actually, considering that everything emerges is not a fanciful view invoked here only for 
the sake of the argument. Classical as well as contemporary emergentists have embraced – 
and continue to embrace – such a view (see for instance Morgan, 1923; and Morowitz, 2002). 
It may be noted that one should qualify the assertion “everything is emergent” by saying that 
everything but the elementary pieces of reality – supposing these exist and whatever their 
very nature is – and maybe some idealized “pure” aggregates of them is emergent.	  v	  Of course no thinker really is – or will admit she is – a proponent of the first trend so 
presented, insofar as it has been voluntarily caricatured. Nevertheless, as it will be argued 
later in this paper, some thinkers conceptualize emergence in a way that may be considered 
empty of content, insofar as their concept is either unstable – if not thoroughly inconsistent – 
or trivial. Since they are more prone to show their faces, proponents of the second trend are 
easier to identify. Either they advocate an abandonment of what they consider to be a spooky 
or kooky notion (Weinberg, 1992), or they adopt a less radical deflationary attitude by 
construing the concept in a less ambitious way (see for instance the notion of “relative 
emergence” in Malisoff, 1939; or Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948; the concept of “weak 
emergence” in Bedau, 1997; or emergence as a “visualization constructed in the mind of the 
observer” in Ronald et al., 1999, p. 228).	  vi	  Beginning as early as Lovejoy, 1927. More recently, see for instance Stephan, 1999a; Van 
Gulick 2001; Cunningham 2001; Gillett, 2002; Deacon, 2007; or Bedau, 2010. On the model 
of all these analyses, I focus on the “synchronic” form of emergence in this paper, and leave 
aside its “diachronic” declination. More on this distinction can be found in Sartenaer, 2015. vii	  For an identification of the first two challenges, see for instance Kim, 2006; and more 
recently Garrett, 2013. For the triviality/liberality challenge in the two forms described below, 
see respectively Berenda, 1953; Huneman, 2008; or Kim, 1998, chapter 3 for discussion; and 
Smart, 1981; or Delehanty, 2005.	  viii	  Another possible and connected trouble for emergentism – call it the novelty challenge – is 
to provide a positive characterization of what assertions like “emergent properties are new 
properties” are supposed to mean, insofar as novelty is usually defined negatively, either as an 
epistemic limitation or as an antecedent non-existence. 	  ix	  In this particular ontological context, the consistency challenge often takes the form of what 
may be called Kim's causal challenge, which consists in giving a coherent account of the 
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causal autonomy of emergent entities (e.g. through downward causation), essentially in the 
face of causal overdetermination.	  x	  Such liberal account has been endorsed in Bunge, 1977. It is now more often endorsed by 
scientists in popular works (see for instance Reisse, 2006; or Lestienne, 2012).	  xi	  For example, such account of irreducibility is endorsed in Williams, 1998. For a short 
discussion of Williams' view, see Melnyk, 2003, p. 219. 	  xii	  For historical analyses of British Emergentism, see Blitz, 1992; McLaughlin, 1992; 
Stephan, 1992; and Stephan, 1999b. For identifications of earlier versions of what may be 
called “proto-emergentisms”, see for instance Fagot-Largeault, 2002 (proto-emergentism in 
French spiritualism); Malaterre, 2007 (proto-emergentism in neo-vitalism); Clayton, 2004 
(proto-emergentism in Plotinian emanationism); Heinaman, 1990; and Caston, 1997 (proto-
emergentism in Aristotelianism); or Ganeri, 2011 (proto-emergentism in Indian philosophy). 	  xiii	  For the sake of generality, I speak here of emergent entities in place of properties, laws, 
processes, or whatever other relata of emergence one would want to consider.	  xiv	  Since it would lead me too far away from my initial purpose, I will not discuss this 
“layered” view of nature in this paper. For useful discussions, see Emmeche et al., 1997; or 
Kim, 2002.	  xv	  As an attempt to cover different emergentist trends, this sample is voluntarily heteroclite. It 
includes quotes from a “classical” British emergentist (Alexander), an American proponent of 
emergent evolutionism (Sellars) and a co-founder of pragmatism who developed an 
emergentist theory of mind (Dewey).	  xvi	  For example, Van Gulick's “radical emergence” falls short of meeting the continuity thesis, 
insofar as it implies a lack of bottom-up determination (Van Gulick, 2001).	  xvii	  I am not construing here the notion of substance as necessarily referring to something that 
has an independent existence or that persists through time. Rather I simply consider 
substances to be property carriers. I also adopt the causal theory of properties and the 
metaphysical presupposition that, contrary to the thesis of the “infinite descent”, there exists 
in nature something like a fundamental level populated by elementary objects. I also only 
consider each form of monism in its materialistic or physicalistic declination, leaving out 
other options like idealism, mentalism, etc. Finally, I take here “realization” in the broad 
sense of constitution that can either be compositional or non-compositional, a difference that 
can be captured by Gillett’s (2003) distinction between “dimensioned” and “flat” realization. xviii	  One can vindicate the idea that substance pluralism entails property pluralism through the 
contrapositive of the identity of indiscernibles – or McTaggart's principle of the dissimilarity 
of the diverse – stating that two distinct entities must differ from one another by at least one 
property. Justifying the idea that property pluralism entails predicate pluralism requires the 
commitment to a minimal form of realism. In a realistic context, it is indeed arguable that 
heterogenous properties are referred to by distinct predicates or, by contraposition, that co-
extensional predicates refer to one and the same property.	  xix	  Materialism in thus defined in its “atomistic” sense, namely as the thesis according to 
which everything is made of elementary bits of matter, whatever these are. Physicalism is 
here identified with “realization physicalism” in a materialistic context, i.e. the thesis that 
every property is realized by combinations of physical properties of material objects. 
xx This may be justified by claiming that (i) Nagelian reductionism entails token physicalism, 
a view that assumes explanatory reduction (see Fodor, 1974, p. 101) and (ii) functionally 
reducible properties are not necessarily type-identical with their reduction basis, for physical 
mechanisms in virtue of which laws of the special sciences hold can be “wildly” 
heterogeneous (see Fodor, 1974, p. 107). 
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  xxi	  “Non-deductive physicalism” is an evocative expression I borrow from Smart, 1981. The 
superscript R* is meant to refer to functional or explanatory reduction – explanation being 
considered in a causal or mechanistic (and non-deductive-nomological) sense.	  xxii	  To be rigorous, though it is clear that explanatory and causal emergentisms are at least 
committed to functional (and more generally explanatory) irreducibility, I have not yet argued 
that they are also committed to supervenience. This will become clear below.	  xxiii	  The pairing of Dup with the continuity requirement and Ddown with the discontinuity 
requirement is vindicated by the ontological priority – both historical and constitutive – that 
lower levels have over higher levels, and which emergentists and reductionists alike generally 
take for granted. In this context, the lowest level (say, micro-physics) is the reference level 
with regard to which one evaluates ascriptions of continuity or discontinuity. Another 
justification of the preferred pairing can be made through examples. Cartesian interactionism 
is a form of dualism committed to the existence of some Ddown but no Dup. By contrast, 
Reductive materialism is a form of monism committed to the existence of some Dup but no 
Ddown.	  	  xxiv	  I take for granted here a lesson coming from classic and overtly anti-epiphenomenalist 
emergentism, namely that emergence is primarily a matter of “making a difference” in the 
world (see for instance Alexander, 1920, p. 9; Morgan, 1923, pp. 16-17; or Sellars, 1933, p. 
322). This train of thought is actually still typical of today's emergentism. In this perspective, 
I leave aside varieties of emergence that would not be associated with a minimal form of 
high-level determinative potency. Note that it has been shown (see e.g. Kim, 1992, p. 136) 
that same-level causation necessarily entails downward causation in a context where at least 
supervenience is assumed. This rules out the possibility for emergentism to constitute a form 
of pure parallelism. Note also that, as it will become clear below, Ddown is not restricted to 
classic downward causation. 
xxv As it will be explicated below, another way of showing this is to draw one’s attention on 
the fact that, whereas emergentism*’s Dup is realization – and hence also supervenience –, 
causal emergentism’s Dup is only brute supervenience, that is, supervenience without 
realization. 
xxvi It is noteworthy that supervenience may actually be considered as compatible with some 
versions of substance pluralism, an example of which is Nida-Rümelin's dualist emergentism 
(Nida-Rümelin, 2007). Nonetheless, more radical forms of substance pluralism that think of 
substances as capable of an independent existence – on the model of Stahl's dualistic vitalism 
or Descartes' dualistic interactionism – deny supervenience, insofar as they deny any form – 
however minimal – of bottom-up determination (see for instance Caston, 2000, regarding 
Driesch's vitalism). In such a context, two materially identical beings could be such that the 
first is inert while the second is alive, for it is gifted, say, with Stahlian anima. 	  xxvii	  As a result, every physically realized property is necessarily supervenient on its realizers, 
but not vice versa (so there can be supervenient but unrealized properties, as it will become 
clear below). A brief definitional justification: assuming that property P2 is realized in 
property P1 on a given occasion, so that P1's existence is constitutively sufficient for P2's 
existence on this occasion, then P2 supervenes on P1, insofar as (i) for each entitiy x having P2, 
there exists at least one property Pi such that x has Pi, and (ii) when x has Pi, it necessarily has 
P2. Thesis (i) merely derives from the fact that P1 is a proper candidate for Pi and thesis (ii) 
derives from (i) and the realization hypothesis.	  xxviii	  Since causation cannot be self-reflexive, in the sense that a given event cannot be its own 
cause and effect, emergent downward causal powers are new powers that cannot in principle 
be possessed by emergent bases.	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  xxix	  Even if it is difficult to have a clear idea of exactly what kind of emergence Sperry tried to 
put forward in the 1970', it may be argued that his view amounts to something like 
emergence*. By the way, the fact that emergence* falls short of meeting the consistency 
challenge (see below) is probably a reason why many thinkers have regularly expressed 
skepticism about the coherence of Sperry's view (see for instance Smart, 1981). 	  xxx	  The causal inheritance principle states that “if a second-order property P2 is realized on a 
given occasion by a first-order property P1 [...], then the causal powers of this particular 
instance of P2 are identical to (or are a subset of) the causal powers of P1 (or of this instance 
of P1)” (Kim, 1998, p. 54, with modified notations). A qualification: this holds if one 
conceives of realization – as it is the case here – as token identity. Other possible accounts of 
realization are not envisioned here. For a comprehensive overview of these, see Baysan, 2015. xxxi	  For textual evidence, see for instance Broad, 1925, pp. 67-68 (for supervenience); and 
Morgan, 1923, pp. 16-17 (for downward causation). It should nevertheless be noted that, 
while it is clear that British emergentists were committed to brute supervenience, it is not 
obvious that they construed downward causation in the same way as Sperry did latter. It is a 
matter of exegesis to establish if their idea of macro-determination was not more akin to what 
I will call below “Sellars-style” downward causation.	  xxxii	  While it is certain that British Emergentism dramatically suffered from a lack of empirical 
support (McLaughlin, 1992), it is also clear that the radical bruteness – and thus the absolute 
inscrutability – of supervenience (and consequently emergence) also played a major role in 
the movement's fall. Early commentators already considered this move as a “scientific 
betrayal” (Montague, 1929) or as the “weightiest defect in the entire theory” (Ablowitz, 1939, 
p. 14).	  xxxiii	  In a quite similar fashion, proponents of materialistic vitalism (e.g. Bordeu, Ménuret, La 
Caze, Fouquet or Bichat) may be considered as causal emergentists. While they obviously 
considered vital properties as causally potent, they also construe them as brutely supervenient 
on physical properties, as such kind of claim suggests: “To create the universe God endowed 
matter with gravity, elasticity, affinity, etc., and furthermore one portion received as its share 
sensibility and contractility” (Bichat, 1805, quoted in Bechtel and Richardson, 2010, p. 102). 
It may also be argued that Aristotle was a causal emergentist in the sense defined here (see 
Caston, 2000).	  xxxiv	  So this view is actually consistent with British emergentism, considering the following 
kind of assertion: “[W]hen some new kind of relatedness is supervenient (say at the level of 
life), the way in which the physical events which are involved run their course is different in 
virtue of its presence – different from what it would have been if life had been absent [...]. 
The new relations emergent at each higher level guide and sustain the course of events 
distinctive of that level [...]” (Morgan, 1923, pp. 16-17). The sketch proposed here also seems 
to be consistent with Gillett's recent proposal of “conditioned aggregation”, which “allows 
that component entities, like lower-level realizer properties, only contribute certain powers 
when aggregating into and composing a certain "whole" such as a realized property. As a 
result, where we have Conditioned aggregation a realized property instance can be efficacious 
not by contributing powers itself, but by determining the contributions of powers by other 
property instances in its own realizers (i.e. its own components). Though composed, such a 
realized property would still determine the powers of individuals and be efficacious” (Gillett, 
2010, p. 33. Italics in the original).	  xxxv	  It should be clear in which sense representational and causal emergentisms are said to be 
respectively committed to causal continuity and discontinuity. I do not consider that there is 
some causal discontinuity by virtue of the possible co-existence of two different types of 
causal relation – intra-level efficient causation and inter-level emergent causation – but by 
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virtue of brute gaps in the way that (one type of) causal powers combine. “Causal 
discontinuity” thus captures the lack of causal inheritance rather than causal eclecticism.	  xxxvi	  This notion then encompasses the intentional selection of artifacts, the natural selection of 
organic traits, the “learning” selection of behaviors, the cultural selection of institutions, 
physico-chemical sorting processes, etc.	  
